Roger Burdette's Saint Gaudens Double Eagles Book 4 4

[GoldFinger1969]

Roger.....on Page 151 you have FN 188 saying that until RoAC it was assumed that Barber changed the date from MCMVII to 1907.  You say that was an error but the text attached to the FN doesn't imply anybody else worked on the coin. 

Under COMMENTARY, you mention Barber fiddling around with the design and deviating more from ASG's vision.  But no other name is listed.

So who are you implying was responsible for the change from the Roman to Arabic date numbers ?

Edited January 24 by GoldFinger1969

[RWB]

On 1/23/2024 at 4:06 PM, GoldFinger1969 said:

Here is the link, hope that linking ATS is permitted here:

https://forums.collectors.com/discussion/comment/13643555#Comment_13643555

I commented that it was a spectacular coin....and FFL commented about the SP designation and the coin's pedigree.  It's about 2/3rds of the way down the thread....make sure to check out the pictures of some great coins, including the MCMVII HR discussed here. 

You can post my comment to that thread if you wish.

ALL MCMVII coins were made the same way. Differences in appearance are normal variation and there are/were no special pieces, specimens, proof or other such pieces. Any claim otherwise is a misrepresentation of the facts. This is another example of incomplete, inept research, and a failure to consult knowledgeable sources outside of their own little factories.

RE: Collars.There were only two collars used for the HR MCMVII. The first was carried forward from the pattern pieces and was in sole use until mid-November when a second collar and pair of dies were added to manufacture. From then until the final pieces were struck both collars were in use without special distinction or identification.

[GoldFinger1969]

2nd Time Is Better:   Just wanted to say that I am reading Bowers book on Double Eagles for the 2nd time and it is SO MUCH easier to comprehend lots of the data, striking and die information, intricate descriptions, etc.  I think this applies to ANY book but especially ones we first read in this hobby because sometimes just getting through the book is the goal instead of retaining lots of information.

That is certainly true with a huge volume like RWB's Saints book.  Eventually, I am going to re-read it from beginning to end.....and the same with FMTM which was a book I really didn't absorb at all (I think I got it like 7-8 years ago before I was super-active on the coin threads).

Reading and posting thousands of times on all the different forums you become that much more knowledgeable about stuff, even if you still lag the veterans and experts.  But it makes re-reading books you may have just skimmed that much more immersive and understandable. 

[RWB]

Learning has a beginning but never ends.

[RWB]

The newly digitized materials from NARA include a large portion of correspondence about the Saint-Gaudens coin designs. See the other thread for access details.

https://boards.ngccoin.com/topic/433067-large-addition-to-nnps-us-mint-records/

 

Edited March 19 by RWB

[GoldFinger1969]

On 3/19/2024 at 11:50 AM, RWB said:

The newly digitized materials from NARA include a large portion of correspondence about the Saint-Gaudens coin designs. See the other thread for access details.

Good stuff...thanks for posting it.

I wonder if they ever thought about striking a few MCMVIII HR's EVERY year, changing the date ? 

[zadok]

On 3/19/2024 at 12:28 PM, GoldFinger1969 said:

Good stuff...thanks for posting it.

I wonder if they ever thought about striking a few MCMVIII HR's EVERY year, changing the date ? 

...yea but then they came to their senses....

[Henri Charriere]

On 1/28/2024 at 10:29 AM, GoldFinger1969 said:

....and the same with FMTM which was a book I really didn't absorb at all (I think I got it like 7-8 years ago before I was super-active on the coin threads)....

🐓:  Hey Q!  Get a load of this precious gem: ".... before I was super-active on the coin threads)..."

Q.A.:  Whoa Nellie!  That's before we got here five years ago!  Back then, he was a "mild-mannered reporter for a great metropolitan newspaper."  Hard to believe... I wonder what changed... Tempus fugit.   

[GoldFinger1969]

What would have happened if you showed up at a FRB or the Treasury with this note in the late-1920's -- would you have gotten gold bars or coins ?

Edited March 22 by GoldFinger1969

[Henri Charriere]

On 3/22/2024 at 12:51 PM, GoldFinger1969 said:

What would have happened if you showed up at a FRB or the Treasury with this note in the late-1920's -- would you have gotten gold bars or coins ?

Yes. It says, "REDEEMABLE IN GOLD ON DEMAND." With silver certificates, 1967 was the last year in which such currency could be redeemed.  I would guess the last year for "redeemable in gold" FR notes was in the 1930's following issuance of the Executive Order.

[If this note is yours, have you thought of having it encapsulated?  It looks to be of Exceptional Paper Quality.]

[GoldFinger1969]

On 3/22/2024 at 1:05 PM, Henri Charriere said:

[If this note is yours, have you thought of having it encapsulated?  It looks to be of Exceptional Paper Quality.]

It is...it's a PMG-58.  

[RWB]

On 3/22/2024 at 12:51 PM, GoldFinger1969 said:

What would have happened if you showed up at a FRB or the Treasury with this note in the late-1920's -- would you have gotten gold bars or coins ?

In 1927 you would have gotten 10-20 at hard labor. Until April 1933 you could have gotten gold coin, silver coin, or silver certificates. After July 1933 only silver coin or any kind of paper currency except gold certificates. You would never have gotten gold bullion unless you had $5,000 minimum and went through a large bank and paid a 0.5% premium. (FRBs and Treasury did not handle bullion.)

[GoldFinger1969]

On 3/22/2024 at 3:48 PM, RWB said:

In 1927 you would have gotten 10-20 at hard labor. 

Yeah, imagine having a time machine....going back in time...and having a coin or currency from the FUTURE.  Kind of sabotage your time-travel plans if you get caught. 

On 3/22/2024 at 3:48 PM, RWB said:

Until April 1933 you could have gotten gold coin

So this $20 FRN was basically as good as a Gold Certificate.... except it probably wasn't backed by actual gold coins held as reserves at FRBs ?  

[RWB]

I'll have to check the enabling details on that, but the gold clause suggests it.

[GoldFinger1969]

On 3/23/2024 at 10:14 AM, RWB said:

I'll have to check the enabling details on that, but the gold clause suggests it.

I'll look too.  Can't find a good website describing this but not in my 2 currency books, maybe in the others.

[GoldFinger1969]

Might re-post this in one of the Hoard Threads, but given the prominence of the MCMVII HR I thought it could go here.

Doug Winter posted back in early-2021 about a stealth hoard of MCMVII HR's that had depressed prices.  I reached out to him for more details but never heard back.  Anyway, from his blog at the time:

"...In 2019, an average quality PCGS MS63 1907 Wire Edge High Relief $20 typically sold for around $20,000. In late 2019/early 2020 a substantial hoard of High Reliefs in MS63 through MS65 came onto the market and prices dropped to $14,000-15,000 by the middle of 2020. Prices rose slightly towards the end of the year but these are likely to remain flat in 2021."

I'll scout recent pricing the last 2-3 years to see if they have bounced back as I think they have.  If anybody has heard about this "MCMVII HR Hoard" -- and where it might come from (probably domestic) -- chime in. 

 

[RWB]

Without hard evidence, it's just rancid bologna.

[GoldFinger1969]

On 4/2/2024 at 10:49 AM, RWB said:

Without hard evidence, it's just rancid bologna.

I would assume a dealer like Winter who puts his thoughts out in the open in his blog (as opposed to other dealers who can talk their own book or bullbleep) is going to have some quantifiable reference to say something like that.  If he normally sees 5-10 coins per month and all of a sudden with no change in pricing he sees 20-25, he knows something is up.

At least I would.  

[RWB]

On 4/3/2024 at 1:24 AM, GoldFinger1969 said:

is going to have some quantifiable reference to say something like that.  If he normally sees 5-10 coins per month and all of a sudden with no change in pricing he sees 20-25, he knows something is up.

Is he telling facts that he knows, or simply spinning a story abut some assumed "stealthy hoard?"

His price changes can be checked for reality, but not his "reasons" for them....if he has any.

[Henri Charriere]

[I do not know know the gentleman, only some of what he's written. But I can speak for myself and if someone were to ask me a question like that, regarding a possible hoard, I hate to say it but I would respond in true Noo Yawk fashion, demanding to know:  WHO WANTS TO KNOW???]   🤣

[GoldFinger1969]

On 4/3/2024 at 12:49 PM, RWB said:

Is he telling facts that he knows, or simply spinning a story abut some assumed "stealthy hoard?"

His price changes can be checked for reality, but not his "reasons" for them....if he has any.

I guess it's POSSIBLE that the increase in supply was just a coincidence of a bunch of MCMVII HR holders deciding to sell that month.

If it persists, it could mean elderly people passing on and/or estates being liquidated.

[RWB]

We are already in an age-related redistribution of collector coins (and kegs of wheat cents, etc.). Children born 1935-1950, who collected coins, are now dying at an accelerating rate. Without a specific, previously unidentified source, the "hoard" is merely part of statistical randomness. (Humans are sensitive to pattern making - it is one way we organize the world. Pareidolia is one kind of the same class of human organizational actions.)

[GoldFinger1969]

Gold Standard, pre- and post-WW I:   Roger's book talks about gold flows, the gold (exchange) standard, and central bank happenings. 

Ben Bernanke -- before he became Fed Chairman -- was a prolific researcher and author and wrote a review of Barry Eichengreen's Golden Fetters book about the gold policies of the 1920's and 1930's.  Here he talks about what Eichengreen discusses as a key overlooked difference in global monetary policies before and after World War I:

"With respect to the differences between the classical and interwar gold standards, Eichengreen emphasizes the twin themes of credibility and cooperation. He argues that, in the classical period, the commitment of major central banks to maintain the gold value of their currencies was highly credible. This credibility reflected less the status or behavior of central banks themselves than it did the particular political equilibrium (as well as the state of economic understanding) that prevailed at the time. Because of weak labor movements and a generally poor appreciation by the public of the links between monetary policy and the real economy, in the latter part of the nineteenth century there was little political pressure on central banks to manipulate the exchange rate in order to maintain high levels of output and employment.

Further, in the prewar period it was widely expected that, in the event of an exchange rate crisis, the major central banks would cooperate to protect the established parities. When the Baring crisis of 1890 threatened the pound, for example, the Bank of England received loans (and promises of as much support as was needed) from the Bank of France and the Bank of Russia. This cooperation arose from the close relations that existed among central banks and the maintained view of central bankers that they all had a stake in the preservation of the international system. Eichengreen argues that the intrinsic credibility of central banks’ commitment to the gold standard, supplemented by the presumption of cooperation among central banks, implied that the bulk of speculation during the classical period would be stabilizing rather than destabilizing. For example, if a currency slipped beneath its official value, a speculative capital inflow would ensue in anticipation of a supporting action by the central bank. The possibility that the currency might instead be devalued (which, if widely accepted, would lead to destabilizing capital outflows) was usually given little weight.

In contrast, according to Eichengreen, levels of credibility and cooperation were much lower under the interwar gold standard. First, domestic political equilibria were sharply changed by the war and the progressive social movements of the early twentieth century. In order to buy labor peace during the war, many governments greatly expanded the rights of workers to participate in the political process and to unionize. Extension of the franchise both to nonproperty-owners and to women sharply changed the compositions of legislatures and legislators’ constituencies. This democratization, coupled with a better understanding of the links between central bank actions and domestic economic activity, eliminated the presumption that external stability would always take precedence over internal stability as a goal for monetary policy. The political changes also led to distributional struggles among the classes, which increased uncertainty about fiscal policy and in particular raised the spectre of persistent deficits that might have to be monetized. In short, whatever the general desirability of post-World War I political changes, they increased the probability that the central bank would be forced to sacrifice defense of the exchange rate in order to achieve domestic output and employment objectives, or in order to finance the government’s deficit. 

Domestic political changes during the interwar period were matched by equally large changes in the international sphere. In the classical period, as we have said, a central bank facing an exchange rate crisis could have counted on substantial assistance from other central banks, either through loans or through coordination of discount rates. But this cooperation and mutual assistance withered in the postwar era of bad feeling, in which a variety of disputes, notably over the payment of reparations and the repayment of war debts, soured international relations at all levels. The potential for international cooperation was also reduced by the inexperience and inward-looking propensities of the Federal Reserve, which - reflecting America’s postwar economic and political dominance - would have been the obvious institution to take over the Bank of England’s mantle as the ‘conductor of the international orchestra’. 

Because of reduced credibility and cooperation in the interwar period, the presumption that central banks would always be able to defend the parity was greatly weakened in the interwar period.  Speculation therefore became destabilizing, in that a weakening of a currency or a loss of reserves now prompted capital outflows rather than inflows. The consequences of this change in speculative behavior became clearest in the financial crises of 1931, in which central banks were forced either to abandon gold or to adopt extremely deflationary policies in order to defend the parity."

 

Edited 15 hours ago by GoldFinger1969