Does Every U.S. Coin Have Legal Tender Status?

[GoldFinger1969]

1933 DE were exactly the same as those of 1932 or any other date in the series. They meet all standards for legal tender coinage.

Those 445,000 or so DE's were never monetized. The owner of the 2002 auction had to pay $20 to monetize the coin after forking over $7.5 MM.

I do not agree with either of the statements.

Well, here's what happened:

 

http://www.goldrushgallery.com/news/faroukcoin.html

 

Needed $20 to monetize it. I guess because it wasn't legal tender technically.

[RWB]

"Those 445,000 or so DE's were never monetized."

 

"Monetized is pure absurd bologna!" The term was not used in 1933 and only used by Treasury in relation to silver bullion that was redefined as "money" rather than being struck into silver dollars. Using the term in relation to the Farouk 1933 DE was a cop-out by Treasury to support their claim of ownership.

 

They were coins as soon as the Coiner said they were and were accepted by the Superintendent. That is the way it worked back then.

 

The statement: "1933 DE were exactly the same as those of 1932 or any other date in the series. They meet all standards for legal tender coinage." Is correct is all respects. If Mr McKnowitall and others disagree, please present your evidence showing how they were different in 1933.

 

 

 

[Mr.Mcknowitall]

"Those 445,000 or so DE's were never monetized."

 

"Monetized is pure absurd bologna!" The term was not used in 1933 and only used by Treasury in relation to silver bullion that was redefined as "money" rather than being struck into silver dollars. Using the term in relation to the Farouk 1933 DE was a cop-out by Treasury to support their claim of ownership.

 

They were coins as soon as the Coiner said they were and were accepted by the Superintendent. That is the way it worked back then.

 

The statement: "1933 DE were exactly the same as those of 1932 or any other date in the series. They meet all standards for legal tender coinage." Is correct is all respects. If Mr McKnowitall and others disagree, please present your evidence showing how they were different in 1933.

 

 

 

Whoa......I am not the person disagreeing. I think you meant to say "If Mr. Goldfinger and others disagree....."

[RWB]

1933 DE were exactly the same as those of 1932 or any other date in the series. They meet all standards for legal tender coinage.

Those 445,000 or so DE's were never monetized. The owner of the 2002 auction had to pay $20 to monetize the coin after forking over $7.5 MM.

 

I do not agree with either of the statements.

I took the above quite to refer to both of the statements. If I was mistaken, I apologize.

 

[Mr.Mcknowitall]

1933 DE were exactly the same as those of 1932 or any other date in the series. They meet all standards for legal tender coinage.

Those 445,000 or so DE's were never monetized. The owner of the 2002 auction had to pay $20 to monetize the coin after forking over $7.5 MM.

 

I do not agree with either of the statements.

I took the above quite to refer to both of the statements. If I was mistaken, I apologize.

 

I meant the 2 statements in the post by Mr. Goldfinger. 1st sentence is one statement and 2nd statement is another statement.

 

No harm no foul.

[RWB]

OK. I misunderstood -- a bad case of "literal-itis" on my part.

[GoldFinger1969]

OK. I misunderstood -- a bad case of "literal-itis" on my part.

 

We were on a quasi-gold standard in 1933 so that's why they didn't use the word 'monetazation.'

All I know is that the government wanted $20 extra upon the millions they split with the co-owner to legalize/monetize the coin.

[RWB]

In 1933 we were on a real gold standard - actually, we were just about the only nation to retain a fully functioning gold coinage after WW-I. That was President Wilson's decision.

 

From approval of the Gold Standard Act on March 14, 1900 to approval of the United States Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, the United States was on a gold exchange standard. This meant that the government fixed the price of gold by statute, and that there was completely free exchange of the metal in either bullion or coin form.

 

The Executive Orders of 1933 were made under emergency powers granted in 1917 and were temporary measures to prevent hoarding and export of gold. The actions had the effect of decoupling the US dollar from European currencies, which helped stabilize the dollar in domestic markets. (The Mints were not even included in the orders.)

 

Treasury Dept. legal memoranda argue back and forth about gold coins in commercial uses. The consensus and opinion of Chief Legal Counsel Herman Oliphant was that before late August 1933 all US gold coins could be used in any manner as before except export. After August, the situation was confused, but that is also the beginning of a period when President Roosevelt and Treasury Secretary (de facto) Morgenthau issued daily fixings of the dollar price of gold used in buying from miners.

 

1933 DE were manufactured and handled in exactly the same way as double eagles of previous years. Minor changes occurred only after the Mints were told to stop paying out gold coin in exchange for deposits. The June 1933 vault records were handled the same way as June 1932 and June 1931, etc.

 

"Monetization" in relation to the Farouk 1933 DE was a meaningless ploy by Treasury to assert control it never had. It was already money. Further, the Act of 1934 and Presidential Order changed the gold price to $35/T. oz. So if it was really being converted from "bullion" to "money" (as the term 'monetization' was used in relation to silver bullion) the amount paid should have been $33.87 not $20.

 

 

[GRIPE --

The information about gold standards and monetary use of gold that collectors commonly rely on is grossly inaccurate, biased, incomplete and an embarrassment to anyone wanting facts rather than ground up squirrel guts. Having suffered through the mess of "gold standard" debris in coin hobby pages and publications, I understand why the subject is perpetually obscure and difficult for coin collectors to understand.

 

In several months a new book will be published that will, I hope, dispel the myths and give collectors a clear view of the types of gold standards, their interactions and how these affected US gold coinage production and use.]

 

Sorry to be so long-winded....

 

[RWB]

PS: My dog, Ivan, enjoyed the squirrel buffet.

[dcarr]

The Executive Orders of 1933 were made under emergency powers granted in 1917 and were temporary measures to prevent hoarding and export of gold. The actions had the effect of decoupling the US dollar from European currencies, which helped stabilize the dollar in domestic markets. (The Mints were not even included in the orders.)

 

The real purpose of the 1933 Executive Orders was to bail out the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation. But, of course, they weren't "advertised" as to that reality.

 

 

[RWB]

Previous poster's comment is a good example of what I was griping about ---- But, I'll try to explain the FRB comment - briefly. [The following are excerpts from an economist & historian peer reviewed manuscript for future publication.]

 

"The ripples of bank closures and suspensions that began in Nevada and small communities became a flood, and finally a great unstoppable torrent of closures. March 3 saw a total of twenty-eight states with either all or most banks closed and the remainder operating under severe restrictions. New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman closed his state’s banks on March 4 stating:

 

[font:Times New Roman] The spread of hysteria and the restrictions imposed upon the banking facilities of the country through measures adopted in so many states have, at last, placed upon the New York banks a burden so great that it has finally rendered drastic action imperative here.[/font]

 

"There was more behind Lehman’s declaration than was printed in the newspapers.

 

"The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, by far the largest of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and considered the leading reserve of gold, was in trouble. Daily balance sheets, not publicly available at the time, show the run on the dollar by domestic and foreign speculators had nearly exhausted the bank’s gold supply. From February 1 to March 4, 1933 the New York Federal Reserve Bank lost 61% of its gold reserve. Other Federal Reserve Banks were supposed to help in situations like this, but the second largest reserve district, Chicago, flatly refused and the other ten did likewise. Outstanding potential demands from the Bank of England and other foreign deposits were more than double the New York Bank’s gold reserve. The bank’s reserves were already below the legal limit required to cover paper currency. One large transaction could have put the New York Federal Reserve Bank in default. Governor Lehman’s action prevented that from happening and provided breathing room until President Roosevelt could be inaugurated."

 

As noted by Ben Bernanke:

[font:Times New Roman]The Federal Reserve went on to make a number of serious additional mistakes that deepened and extended the Great Depression of the 1930s. Besides trying to pop the stock market bubble, the Fed made little or no effort to protect the banking system from depositor runs and panics. Most seriously, it permitted a severe deflation in the price level, which drove real interest rates sky-high and greatly increased the pressure on debtors. A small compensation for the enormous tragedy of the Great Depression is that we learned some valuable lessons about central banking. It would be a shame if those lessons were to be forgotten.[/font] [benjamin S. Bernanke, “Asset-Price ‘Bubbles’ and Monetary Policy,” New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, New York. October 15, 2002. (Archives of the Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC.)]

 

During the 1930s, FDR and Morgenthau limited FRB's role, with Treasury taking the leading position in policy functions.

 

That's enough for now.....the subject is not easy and as mentioned earlier, there is much misinformation and bias.

[dcarr]

Previous poster's comment is a good example of what I was griping about ---- But, I'll try to explain the FRB comment - briefly. [The following are excerpts from an economist & historian peer reviewed manuscript for future publication.]

 

"The ripples of bank closures and suspensions that began in Nevada and small communities became a flood, and finally a great unstoppable torrent of closures. March 3 saw a total of twenty-eight states with either all or most banks closed and the remainder operating under severe restrictions. New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman closed his state’s banks on March 4 stating:

 

[font:Times New Roman] The spread of hysteria and the restrictions imposed upon the banking facilities of the country through measures adopted in so many states have, at last, placed upon the New York banks a burden so great that it has finally rendered drastic action imperative here.[/font]

 

"There was more behind Lehman’s declaration than was printed in the newspapers.

 

"The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, by far the largest of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and considered the leading reserve of gold, was in trouble. Daily balance sheets, not publicly available at the time, show the run on the dollar by domestic and foreign speculators had nearly exhausted the bank’s gold supply. From February 1 to March 4, 1933 the New York Federal Reserve Bank lost 61% of its gold reserve. Other Federal Reserve Banks were supposed to help in situations like this, but the second largest reserve district, Chicago, flatly refused and the other ten did likewise. Outstanding potential demands from the Bank of England and other foreign deposits were more than double the New York Bank’s gold reserve. The bank’s reserves were already below the legal limit required to cover paper currency. One large transaction could have put the New York Federal Reserve Bank in default. Governor Lehman’s action prevented that from happening and provided breathing room until President Roosevelt could be inaugurated."

 

As noted by Ben Bernanke:

[font:Times New Roman]The Federal Reserve went on to make a number of serious additional mistakes that deepened and extended the Great Depression of the 1930s. Besides trying to pop the stock market bubble, the Fed made little or no effort to protect the banking system from depositor runs and panics. Most seriously, it permitted a severe deflation in the price level, which drove real interest rates sky-high and greatly increased the pressure on debtors. A small compensation for the enormous tragedy of the Great Depression is that we learned some valuable lessons about central banking. It would be a shame if those lessons were to be forgotten.[/font] [benjamin S. Bernanke, “Asset-Price ‘Bubbles’ and Monetary Policy,” New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, New York. October 15, 2002. (Archives of the Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC.)]

 

During the 1930s, FDR and Morgenthau limited FRB's role, with Treasury taking the leading position in policy functions.

 

That's enough for now.....the subject is not easy and as mentioned earlier, there is much misinformation and bias.

 

Much "misinformation and bias" has come from original and current perpetrators.

You can't necessarily take what Federal Reserve Bank officials and US Government officials say and write at face value, because they are not going to admit what they actually did. It appears that many entities in Europe didn't believe them, and that is why so much gold was flowing to Europe from the United States from before 1929 until some time after 1933.

 

What the Federal Reserve Bank and the US Treasury actually did was this:

 

In 1933, total US Treasury gold reserves were about 6,000 metric tons.

The Federal Reserve Bank itself had negligible gold reserves.

 

The US Treasury gold was totally encumbered by the Gold Certificates it issued from 1905 through 1933. At a bare minimum, in 1933, the outstanding Gold Certificates were the equivalent of 6,000 metric tons of gold. And that figure could actually have been as high as nearly 16,000 metric tons.

 

But that wasn't the real problem.

 

Federal Reserve Notes, issued from 1914 through 1933, were printed with a clause indicating that they were redeemable in gold on demand at the US Treasury. At a bare minimum, in 1933, the outstanding Federal Reserve Notes were the equivalent of 20,000 metric tons of gold. And that figure could actually have been as high as nearly 56,000 metric tons since most of the Federal Reserve Notes would have still been outstanding (in circulation) in 1933.

 

From 1919 through 1933, the Federal Reserve Bank was allowed to keep 10% of their profits. This produced an irresistible incentive to maximize those profits by inflating the economy during the "roaring 20s". This was accomplished by the issuance of between 20,000 to 56,000 metric tons of gold claims on the US Treasury's 6,000 metric tons (which was already 100+% encumbered by US Treasury Gold Certificates).

 

In other words:

 

We (the United States) were supposedly on a gold standard.

They (the Federal Reserve Bank) cheated.

We lost (our gold) in 1933.

 

So I stand by what I said: FDR's 1933 "gold confiscation" was a bailout of the Federal Reserve Bank. In 1933 the Federal Reserve Bank was essentially short an amount that was greater than all the gold in all the world. This, according to FDR himself. The gold confiscation alleviated them of that, and title to all of our gold was turned over to them.

 

And as an additional "reward", the Federal Reserve Bank was then allowed to keep 100% of their profits from 1933 through 1947.

 

 

 

 

[RWB]

It is usually futile to explain or reason with those who have such faith-based beliefs as the previous poster. Interaction only reinforces their opinions and biases.

[Mr.Mcknowitall]

Just another Keynesian simplicity/complexity explanation of the ineptness of illogical conclusions based on logic. Sort of like the Big Mac.

[dcarr]

Accidental double post deleted.

[dcarr]

It is usually futile to explain or reason with those who have such faith-based beliefs as the previous poster. Interaction only reinforces their opinions and biases.

 

Those who are defeated in a debate often exit by denigrating the character of their opponent.

 

Why not, instead, post something that actually attempts to refute the points I made ?

 

Here are the FACTS:

 

In 1933 the US Treasury owned 6,000 metric tons of gold.

The Federal Reserve Bank owned only a token amount, but had access to some US Treasury gold.

 

From 1905 to 1933, the US Treasury issued Gold Certificates to the tune of 16,000 metric tons of gold (about 11 billion dollars total face value).

 

From 1914 to 1933, the Federal Reserve Bank issued gold-clause notes to the tune of 56,000 metric tons of gold (about 36 billion dollars total face value).

 

The 07 May 1933 Roosevelt "fireside chat" address to the nation is perhaps the closest admission of the truth that came out of the Great Depression.

(excerpt):

 

"Much has been said of late about Federal finances and inflation, the gold standard, etc. Let me make the facts very simple and my policy very clear. In the first place, government credit and government currency are really one and the same thing. Behind government bonds there is only a promise to pay. Behind government currency we have, in addition to the promise to pay, a reserve of gold and a small reserve of silver, neither of them anything like the total amount of the currency. In this connection it is worth while remembering that in the past the government has agreed to redeem nearly thirty billions of its debts and its currency in gold, and private corporations in this country have agreed to redeem another sixty or seventy billions of securities and mortgages in gold. The government and private corporations were making these agreements when they knew full well that all of the gold in the United States amounted to only between three and four billions and that all of the gold in all of the world amounted to only about eleven billions."

 

Note how FDR blames the "government" and "corporations", but not the real culprit, the banks (and the Federal Reseve Bank in particular). Also note that the bold portion of the quote above is clearly heard in the audio recording, but was somehow ("conveniently") left out of the written published transcripts.

 

[mark]

dcarr:

 

Why in the world would the Fed have the incentive to "maximize its profit" in the 1920s? The Fed can only pay a dividend of 6% on the stock owned by the member banks, so increasing the profit has NO benefit to those banks. Plus, if the Fed actually did want to maximize its profit, it would have set a much higher inflation rate than it has. (In particular, because creating base money has close to zero marginal cost to the Fed, the Fed would want to set an inflation rate such that the nominal interest rate elasticity of demand for base money equals 1.0, which would call for a MUCH higher inflation than has ever been experienced in the United States.) Further, if the Fed did have an incentive to maximize its profit in the 1920s, when it was allowed to keep 10% of its earnings, that incentive would have soared in the 1930s and 1940s when it was allowed to keep 100% of its profit.

 

Mark

 

Edited addition: dcarr: I think you and RWB are in agreement that the US went off the Gold Exchange standard in 1933 because the Fed was in danger of running out of gold. I believe that point is abundantly clear in the data.

[RWB]

Mark,

No, the NYFRB problem was one of many, but not the reason for suspending the use of gold or the bank holiday. The domestic banking system was near collapse and the bank holiday was intended to improve public confidence and help restore normal economic activity. The primary problems were domestic hoarding of gold exchange instruments (gold certificates, not physical gold), uncontrolled export of physical gold for speculation, and the desire to free the US from foreign currency speculation. Foreign governments expressed anger and betrayal when FDR acted by putting the US economy first. Speculators in Europe lost millions in short-term transactions.

 

Nearly all gold coin and most gold bars were held by the Treasury - as had been the case for decades. The public did not want the coins and commercial banks did not want the bars. The public made extensive use of gold certificates and FR Notes, and banks held gold earmarks and certificates. Physical gold was drawn from the Mints and NYAO by banks when needed for foreign exchange.

 

Hoarding was a problem because it pulled money out of active circulation and turned it into an inactive asset that did not contribute to the economy. Pres. Hoover's admin recognized this and tried to stop the practice several times. He failed each time. FDR & Woodin succeeded because they better understood the emotional factors involved in hoarding money. (Most hoards were in paper currency, not gold.)

 

By June 1933 the US had resumed gold standard operations but with a floating price and full documentation of Ex/Im functions and earmarks. This shifted the US out of its traditional full gold exchange model and removed the need for circulating gold coinage or to strike gold coins to support gold certificates.

 

The subject is complex and involves actions and reactions by many parties and governments over a long time. The US remained on a dollar-gold standard until the Breton Woods Accords were finally put aside. Trying to discuss it here is frustrating and inefficient.

[mark]

RWB:

 

Publish your d@mn book so I can buy it and read it!!

 

A tad more seriously, clearly bank runs played a huge role in collapsing the banking system. I never thought extensively about what the public was withdrawing from the banks. I imagined it was gold coin but did not pursue that thought. So ... once again, I need (and want!) your book!!!

 

Mark

[RWB]

Mark,

It will eventually be published. Because of past confusion about the subject (as you can see from this thread), I am having all of it reviewed by independent historians and economists - that takes a lot of time to do.

 

Bank Runs - When people lost faith in a bank, they wanted money in whatever form they could get. That was usually paper and small coins. Gold coins did not circulate much and even large banks carried only a token quantity for counter use. Gold certificates were fully convertible into gold coin or bullion, so having the physical item did not matter much. The last big attempt to counter hoarding was during early 1932 when Pres. Hoover backed a campaign to get hoarded cash back into circulation. It worked until the Chicago bank failures of June 1932 and then the public panicked again.

 

A big part of the problem was that banks had no meaningful financial safety net. Failures numbered in the hundreds each year as they had for decades. Depositors had little practical recourse in recovering their funds from a failed bank. There was no deposit insurance (except for Postal savings accounts).

 

Woodin and FDR helped restore public confidence by taking strong, nation-wide action. This was something that Hoover and his party did not understand because they were stuck in ideology and ignored practicality. FDR had no specific plan - no wide-ranging long-term solution - the plan was to do what seemed the best for the whole country, and if a better idea came along, try that. The Bank Holiday came with examinations of banks at all levels. Insolvent or unstable banks were merged into good banks.This avoided losses to depositors. The public responded by redepositing millions in hoarded money and then not withdrawing it again. Congress followed up by separating banking from stock brokering, and eliminating most speculative options for banks. Later, Federal Deposit Insurance was enacted in 1933 and took effect Jan 1, 1934 specifically to protect depositors from losses if a participating bank failed. (The system worked during the Bush Depression - although there were many bank failures, not one depositor lost their money.)

[dcarr]

dcarr:

 

Why in the world would the Fed have the incentive to "maximize its profit" in the 1920s? The Fed can only pay a dividend of 6% on the stock owned by the member banks, so increasing the profit has NO benefit to those banks. Plus, if the Fed actually did want to maximize its profit, it would have set a much higher inflation rate than it has. (In particular, because creating base money has close to zero marginal cost to the Fed, the Fed would want to set an inflation rate such that the nominal interest rate elasticity of demand for base money equals 1.0, which would call for a MUCH higher inflation than has ever been experienced in the United States.) Further, if the Fed did have an incentive to maximize its profit in the 1920s, when it was allowed to keep 10% of its earnings, that incentive would have soared in the 1930s and 1940s when it was allowed to keep 100% of its profit.

 

Mark

 

Edited addition: dcarr: I think you and RWB are in agreement that the US went off the Gold Exchange standard in 1933 because the Fed was in danger of running out of gold. I believe that point is abundantly clear in the data.

 

"Why in the world would the Fed have the incentive to "maximize its profit" in the 1920s? "

 

Because, like any corporation, the owners want more money. During this period, the FRB was allowed to keep 10% of their profits. So they had an incentive to loan more, and at higher interest rates. The 6% profit margin that you mention applies to 1947 onward.

 

Using FDR's parlance:

The FRB issued 36 billion dollars in gold clause notes while knowing full well that all the gold in the United States amounted to only 4 billion, and all the gold in all the world amounted to only 11 billion.

 

Where was the governance while this was going on ?

 

If not for the restraints of a supposed gold standard, the FRB probably would have inflated the money supply even further. Perhaps the 11:1 "leverage" on the US Treasury gold that the FRB facilitated was as far as they dared go.

 

During the time span of 1934 to 1946, the FRB issued currency with a total face value of about 66 billion. This was the period where the FRB was allowed to keep 100% of their profits. So they went from issuing 36 billion in 20 years (1914-1933) to issuing 66 billion in 13 years (1934-1946).

 

There are similarities between the Great Depression and 2008. Leading up to both incidents, banks acted recklessly while reaping great profits. But when things turned bad, those earlier profits suddenly weren't available to help keep the banks solvent. And so they petitioned for bailouts, which they received.

 

The FRB was basically short a huge amount of gold. Note that FDR did not raise the official gold price until AFTER the FRB had been relieved of their gold short position.

 

FDR had a "golden" opportunity to just let the Federal Reserve Bank die for good. He could have bailed out national banks and the general public. US Treasury (red seal) notes could have been issued at will to supplant Federal Reserve notes. But instead, not only did FDR rescue the perpetrator of the Great Depression, he handed them additional rewards. Rewards such as transferring title to all of our US Treasury gold to the FRB, and allowing the FRB to keep 100% of its profits during the entire three terms that FDR served as President. Horrible.

 

 

[dcarr]

Foreign governments expressed anger and betrayal when FDR acted by putting the US economy first.

 

The general public should have been angry that FDR put the Federal Reserve Bank ahead of them. But they were too distracted by the lure of the "New Deal" to realize what was going on behind the curtain.

 

Nearly all gold coin and most gold bars were held by the Treasury - as had been the case for decades. The public did not want the coins and commercial banks did not want the bars. The public made extensive use of gold certificates and FR Notes, and banks held gold earmarks and certificates. Physical gold was drawn from the Mints and NYAO by banks when needed for foreign exchange.

 

I disagree that the general public "did not want the [gold] coins". They most certainly did, and preferred them over all other forms of money. But there were two barriers:

 

1) The powers in control (banks, government) were the ones that didn't want the general public to have gold coins. And these authorities did everything to discourage people from owning gold directly (eventually outlawing it altogether).

 

2) During the Great Depression many people did not even have enough money for a single gold coin.

 

Most hoards were in paper currency, not gold.

 

Do you have a source for that contention ?

European banks certainly hoarded a lot of US gold coin.

 

[Mr.Mcknowitall]

Using the words probably, perhaps, could have, such as, and should have, as support of factual history does not clarify an issue, but simply presents an opinion and alternative possibility.

 

Reading Bernard Baruch would be much more helpful. Reading the planning by major industrialists, financiers and free world leaders during the 20s and 30s for WWII (yes, many including FDR and Churchill), that were certain it would occur due to financial reasons and international economic expansionism would also be helpful. Gold reserves was not a wallflower in the planning by these persons.

 

I am not stating you are incorrect, just that there are holes in your presentation, not unusual in such discussions.

[Afterword]

"Using the words probably, perhaps, could have, such as, and should have, as support of factual history does not clarify an issue, but simply presents an opinion and alternative possibility."

 

 

 

What is the factual history in this case? Can it be determined from documents that were written and statements that were recorded? Does accepting such evidence as factual, because of lack of irrefutable evidence to the contrary, make it so?

 

Is it even possible to establish the factual history of something like this, after so much time as passed?

[Mr.Mcknowitall]

"Using the words probably, perhaps, could have, such as, and should have, as support of factual history does not clarify an issue, but simply presents an opinion and alternative possibility."

 

 

 

What is the factual history in this case? Can it be determined from documents that were written and statements that were recorded? Does accepting such evidence as factual, because of lack of irrefutable evidence to the contrary, make it so?

 

Is it even possible to establish the factual history of something like this, after so much time as passed?

 

Question #1: It is as stated in the written historical records of all individuals/entities involved.

Question #2: Yes.

Question #3: Yes.

 

All replies are IMHO, of course.

[RWB]

Multiple original sources establish the basic items I mentioned. The purpose is to be objective and let events and documentation tell the story. (The same as numismatic research.)

 

Mr. Carr's material is neither factual, nor objective. It depends on emotional argument and innuendo rather than the truth. It is contrived by ignorance and bias for whatever motives he might posses.

[Afterword]

"Question #1: It is as stated in the written historical records of all individuals/entities involved."

 

That they are statements is indeed factual, but can it be known whether said statements are based on fact or fiction? There exists the possibility of human error, as well.

 

Your other two answers lack a reference, as I asked four questions and the fact that you only answered three, two of which with a simple "yes", makes it impossible to determine which of the two remaining three questions you chose for response. I suspect, however, that replying to the question in this post will suffice.

 

I am just curious as to whether you accept historical accounts as factually accurate.

 

 

 

[dcarr]

Multiple original sources establish the basic items I mentioned. The purpose is to be objective and let events and documentation tell the story. (The same as numismatic research.)

 

Mr. Carr's material is neither factual, nor objective. It depends on emotional argument and innuendo rather than the truth. It is contrived by ignorance and bias for whatever motives he might posses.

 

If any of my points are not "factual", then why don't you post a specific rebuttal using whatever information you have ?

 

The main point of my posts is this:

 

From 1914 to 1933, the Federal Reserve bank issued 36 billion dollars in gold claims on the US Treasury's 4 billion dollars worth, while also knowing full well that all the gold in all the world amounted to only 11 billion dollars worth.

 

That is a fact.

 

My opinion is that this was malfeasance.

 

Regardless, after everything came crashing down, the Federal Reserve Bank was rewarded, not punished.

 

[mark]

dcarr:

 

I believe the 6% dividend rate (NOT profit margin) was set in Section 7 by the initial Federal Reserve Act in 1913. I also believe that until just this year, the 6% rate was not changed--it's now been lowered for large banks. Privately owned businesses want to increase their profit because they can take the profit home and buy stuff for themselves with it. That option was NOT available to the Fed's member banks.

 

So, let me repeat my question: Why in the world would the Fed have the incentive to "maximize its profit" in the 1920s?

 

Thanks in advance.

 

mark

[disme]

dcarr wrote:

 

I disagree that the general public "did not want the [gold] coins". They most

certainly did, and preferred them over all other forms of money. But there were

two barriers:

 

1) The powers in control (banks, government) were the ones that didn't want

the general public to have gold coins. And these authorities did everything to

discourage people from owning gold directly (eventually outlawing it altogether).

 

2) During the Great Depression many people did not even have enough money

for a single gold coin.

 

Wrong in general. (The second point is true, but irrelevant.) I had conversations

in the early 1950s with many people who were adults in the 1920s. Most families

kept a small amount of gold on hand for emergencies but used paper and non-gold

coins for all daily transactions. I also never met anyone who insisted on gold notes

for such dealings.